Aerospace - Defense

Speaking on October 18 at NYU’s Rudin Center for Transportation Policy & Management, David Gaier, a journalist and former security consultant who writes widely on terrorism, told the group that poor incident command was still a huge vulnerability for urban transit systems, in New York and around the nation. Comparing the situation to the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, Gaier said “At the Gulf Coast, what resulted was chaos, which led to unnecessary human suffering and death. The same thing could happen in transit systems: incident command and control cannot be sorted out after the bomb goes off.” Speaking about the use of technology as a panacea, Gaier mentioned that NYC-MTA has just let a contract for $212 million to install and integrate a massive CCTV monitoring system. Yet he noted that “the London tube (subway) is most heavily-monitored transit system in the world, and while its sophisticated CCTV system helped identify the July bombers, it did nothing to prevent their terrible crime, and apparently nothing to deter them.” Gaier also said that most agencies responsible for security haven’t adopted a truly risk-based planning model: “Security cannot be capricious and arbitrary – and it’s not the same thing as law enforcement.” But he acknowledged that it was difficult for transit agencies to determine the best use of their people and funds, because the federal government has failed to produce a set of attested security standards that was due at the end of 2004. He also noted that “The TSA is still, in reality, the commercial aviation security administration, and has mostly ignored public transit, especially commuter and passenger rail systems.”

Eva Lerner-Lam, President of the Palisades Consulting Group, spoke about what’s happened, four years after 9/11. A policy expert in public transit security, Ms. Lerner-Lam reviewed the findings, conclusions and “common sense” recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and noted that - disappointingly but not surprisingly - Congress failed to enact legislation that would implement many of the most critical recommendations. She commended the Transportation Research Board (TRB) for sponsoring important, peer-reviewed research that has produced useful reports and guidance to transit professionals; however, she noted that the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration have yet to reach out and leverage leading research institutions, opting instead to “go-it-alone” with stove-piped, applied technology solutions. Finally, Ms. Lerner-Lam pointed out that, despite the many benefits of education, outreach, training and drills, there is no national framework and minimal funding for consistent, integrated, coordinated efforts at the regional and local level beyond the three “TOPOFF” exercises that were held in various regions in 2001, 2003 and 2005.

Ron Libengood, CEO of Pittsburgh-based SecuraComm, noted that a transit security anti-terrorism program must include a combination of policies and procedures, technology, and trained manpower. He also echoed Gaier’s concerns about technology, saying “It’s a waste of money to buy technology - such as a large intelligent camera system - and put that technology in front of personnel who are not properly trained to operate, analyze results and direct appropriate responses.” He added “response has been the weakest link…transit systems must improve their response through training and analyzing results from regular drills.”

Much of what Gaier, Lerner-Lam and Libengood discussed is borne out by a report from the GAO released on October 7, 2005. The GAO report found that TSA has not completed passenger rail risk assessments or established a methodology to analyze or characterize risks.

Contacts:
David Gaier: 973-464-1454
Eva Lerner-Lam:201-567-0088
Ron Libengood: 412-963-6858